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CHA.Pl'ER I
INI'RODUCTION

Experimental psychologists have long been concerned with the
study of goal-setting behavior.

During the 1930's, German psycholo-

gists studied such behavior under the rubric, ''level of aspiration. "
The early research on level of aspiration (LOA) centered around the
relationship between success and failure feelings and a person's
aspirations or goals.

The study of LOA soon became popular in America,

since it was amenable to the degree or scientific rigor that was sought
by experimental psychologists or that era.

The research in .America

was done with a strong emphasis on mathematics, objectivity, and
strictly behavioral otservation.

The operational definition that was

used almost exclusively (Frank, 1935a) rested on the assumption that
the LOA that a subject expressed to the experimenter was in fact his
true aspiration.

There was little or no effort to determine the

extent to which this stated aspiration was actually representative of
true aspirations.

EXperimental psychologists generally tried to avoid

.

this problem, since it would have meant a return to less "rigorous"
scientific methods.
Psychomotor tasks have traditionally been used mat extensively
in studies on LOA.

SUch tasks have been used to examine the effects

or reference groups on aspirations (Anderson & Brandt, 1939; Chapman &
Vollanann, 1939; Gould & Lewis, 1940; Hertzma.n & Festi:nger, 1940;
1

2

payne & Hauty, 1955), and the relationship of personality factors. to
goal-setting behavior (Atwal, 1971; Festinger, 1942; Kay, 1973;
:r.efcourt & Steffy, 1970; Rutchik, 1971; Sears, 1940) •

Perhaps the

pri.ma.I"Y focus in this area of research has been the study of the
JD81Ul6r in which LOAs change after experiences of success or failure.

In these experiments success and failure have been operationally
defi:ood according to whether or not the subject's performance reached
his stated IDA.

Again

this carries the implicit assumption that the

stated aspiration is the true aspiration.

This is a dubious

assumption, and, i f it is false, the subjects would not be experiencing success and failure in the manner that the experitoonters have
assumed.

The literature on the effects of success and failure on LOA

has shown that success tends to be followed by increases in level of

aspiration and failure by decreases, but the questions regarding the
validity of the operational definitions cast some doubt upon the
accuracy of the findings.
One of the glaring deficiencies in this area of research has
been the failure to reasonably determine the relationship between IDA
and subsequent performance.

There is still considerable doubt con-

cerning whether or not the specific aspiration level chosen acts as a
determinant of subsequent perforDU:~.nce. · Early research by Mace (1935)
indicated that persons who are given specific and reasonably difficult
goals perform retter than those who are told to strive for vague and/or
easy goals.

Mace worked in the area of applied psych:> logy, and there

has been little attempt to relate his work to LOA.

However, Hertzma.n

and Festinger (1940) did propose that subjects tend to use LOA as an

3

inCentive.

Others (Bayton, 1943; Holt, 1946; Payne & Hauty, 1955)

}lave supported the contention that aspirations can sometimes be
determinants of performance, although the degree to which subjects
are ego-involved in the performance task seems to be a crucial. variable.
MOre recent research

qy

Locke and his associates (Bryan & Locke, 1967;

Locke, 1965, 1966a, 1966b, 1967a, 1967b; Locke & Bryan, 1966a, 1966b,
1967; Locke, Bryan, & Kendall, 1968; Locke, Cartledge, & Koeppel, 1968)
supported the early work of Mace (1935), suggesting that goals are
much more important determinants of performance than was previously
believed.

But once again, there has been little attenpt to integrate

the work in applied psychology (this time by Locke) with that in LOA
studies.
The study of attribution is currently popular a.JOOng social
psychologists, and causal attributions seem to be clearly relevant to
aspirations and performance.

A person's goals and performance are

affected by the manner in which he attributes the cause of a task
outcome to the four factors discussed by Heider (1958): ability, task
difficulty, effort, and luck.

Furthermore, such attributions have

been shown by McMahan (1973) to be a function of a person 1 s original
expectations or confidence.

Since an aspiration level can be con-

sidered a type of expectation, the relationship of causal attributions

to LOA deserves exploration.
The present study clarifies some of the interrelations between

the three areas of research that have been mentioned: WA, goals and
performance (Locke and his associates), and causal attribution.

In

doing so, this study used operational definitions that differed from
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those traditionally used in LOA studies.

A subject's IDA wa:s defined

as his written (as opposed to oral) response to the question of what
be expects his performance to be;

Presumably, a written LOA minimized

the possible effects of a public anoouncement of goals.

Ricciuti

{1951), in his comprehensive review of procedural variations in LOA
research, made no mention of this technique ever being used.

The

manner in which subjects explicitJ.y state IDAs has not been given
sufficient attention.

Considering the social implications of' stating

goals, the distinction between oral and recorded goals may be an
important one, and it is unfortunate that many researchers have ignored
this distinction.

The performance task was a competitive one such

that there was one wirmer and one loser, and success and failure were
defined accordingly.

Although this operational definition does have

a disadvantage in that feelings of success and failure do not
necessarily have a one-to-one correspondence with winning and losing,
this definition probably corresponds more closely to feelings of
success/failure than a definition based on whether the stated IDA was
reached.
The performance task used (electronic table tennis) had some
advantages over more commonly used psychomotor tasks, such as dart
throwing (Hausmann, 1933; Irwin & Mintzer, 1942; McGehee, 1940;
Preston, spiers, & Trasoff, 1947; Ricciuti, 1951; ~nedden, 1936).

It

proVided head-to-head competition, and the participants displayed a
fairly high level of interest and ego-involvement in the task.

This

task also has more generalizability to everyday actiVities than do
tasks such as dart throwing and ring tossing, in that the subjects

were faced with a complex

arr~

or options and decisions.

To determine whether IDA does act as a determinant of performance, the experimenter artificially raised or lowered the
aspiration levels of the student participants by telling them they
would have either an advantage or a disadvantage in their competitive
game due to a putative bias in the game equipment.

One of the problems

in trying to determine the relationship between aspiration level and
performance has been the difficulty in separating ability from
aspiration level.
separation.

The method selected attempted to achieve this

The feasibility of this deception was suggested by the

work of McGehee (1940) , who noted that many of his subjects blamed
bad dart throws on the darts themselves.

The use of these procedural

variations also proVided an opportunity to replicate the findings of
McMahan (1973) and also clarit,r the inconsistencies he found.
The following qypotheses were therefore tested:
1)

SUbjects having a success experience tend to set higher

IDAs for their next performance than those subjects haVing a failure
experience.
2)

There is a positive relationship between IDA and subsequent

performance, irrespective of ability.
3)

SUbjects who believe themselves to be at a disadvantage in

a competitive task because of equipment bias tend to set lower IDAs
and perform at a lower level than subjects who believe themselves to
be at an advantage because of equipment bias.

4)

~'Ubjects who are successful tend

to attribute task outcome

more to internal factors {ability and effort) than do subjects who

6
.fail; subjects who .fail tend to attribute task outcome mre to external
.factors (task difficulty and luck) than do subjects woo succeed.

5)

SUbjects whose original expectations about task outcome

are confirmed tend to attribute task outcome· mre to stable factors
(ability and task difficulty) than do subjects whose original
expectations are discon.firmed; subjects whose original expectations
about task outcome are discon.firmed tend to attribute task outcome
more to variable factors (effort and luck) than do subjects whose
original expectations are confirmed.
6)

subjects who lose in a competitive task consider equipment

bias to be a more important factor in game outcome than do subjects
who win the competitive task.

CHAPTER ll
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Level of Aspiration
Historical perspective.

The concept of

11

level of aspiration"

was first used by the German psychologist Dembo (1931) in relation to
her research on the manner in which feelings of success or failure
are related to previously-set goals.

Iembo

proposed that such feelings

depend not only upon objective performance but also upon the individual. 's "level of aspiration" or performance goals.

Using paper

and pencil mazes, Jucknat (1937) found that the effect of success or
failure in one task on the level of aspiration (LOA) in a second task
depended upon the simiiarity between the two tasks.

These early

German studies were basically qualitative and lacking in experimental
rigor, with success and failure being defined by the

~'s

evaluation

of the subject's feelings.

The first American psychologist to investigate this area was
Frank (1935a), who operationally defined WA as "the level of future

performance in a familiar

~task

which an individual, knowing his level

of past performance in that task, explicitly mdertakes to reach"
(p. 119).

Level of past performance was operationally defined as

"the goodness of the individual's past performance, as he knows it"
{p. ll9) •

In contrast to the previous research in Germany, the

AJnerican investigations of LOA relied on explicit, quantitative, and
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behavioral def'ini tior.s.

b'Uccess was defined as a performance which

reached or surpassed the stated IDA, and failure was merely any
perf'o:rmc:s.nce which f'ell below the IDA.

Ricciuti (1951) described the

typical experiment on lOA:
the subject is given a series of' trials on a task; after each
trial some sort of' score is reported to him. He is then asked
to make some type of estimate, either in terms of goals or
expectations, of his anticipated level of' performance on the
following trial. Various scoring techniques may then be applied
to the results irt an attempt to stuqy objectively such factors
as the characteristic level of the individual's goals with
respect to previous performance, the tendency of the individual
to adjust his aspirations realistically in accordance with
previous success and failure, and other related characteristics.
(p. 2)
The oost popular measure used in IDA studies has been the goal

discrepancy score, defined by Spitzer (1958) as "the difference between
a stated level of' aspiration and the previous performance score 11

(p. 1).

Other measures, such as the average goal discrepancy score,

have also been used widely.

In general, there has been a strong

quantitative emphasis in this area of' research.
Psychological determinants.

In addition to the quantitative

aspects of' this research, there has been a continued effort to discover the psychological determinants of the IDA and related
ramifications of' goal-setting behavior.

Frank (1935a, 1935c) cited

three psychological needs that act as determinants of' the stated
IDA:

(a) the need to keep the IDA as high as possible, (b) the need

to keep the IDA realistic, so that it matches future performance, and
(c) the need to avoid failure.

The relative strengths of these factors

varies across persons, situations, and times, prompting Rotter (1942)
to speak of' a hierarcey of' goals in a state of'

nux.

In an attempt to

9
evaluate the relative strengths of these three needs, Frank (1937)
asked his subjects ''whether they preferred to come close to their
guesses, or whether they preferred to do a lot better" (p. 56).

The

largest group of subjects claimed to have both of these goals.

In a

similar vein, Gould (1939) asked her subjects what they would do next
time, and thereby classified the subjects into three groups:

(a)

those who set their IDAs at a minimum. to be surpassed, (b) those who
set their LOAs at a maximum which they hoped to approach but were
prepared not to reach, and (c) those who set their IDAs at arout the
average of their performance.

Thus the stated IDA can be an incentive,

a protection against failure, or an accurate estimate.

One of the

unanswered questions in this area of research is whether the need to
avoid failure is exaggerated qr the peculiarities of the experimental
situation; the extent of external validity has not been clearly
established.

In the same study Gould described the factors she found

to be operating in the observed goal-setting behaVior:
anxiety and insecurity feelings; desire to excel, to succeed,
to avoid failure; actual level of nnmentary strivings and the
disparity between this level and the explicit estimates; and
general past experiences which have helped determine the
subject's personality organization and thus his reactions to
such demands of inner'and outer forces. (pp. lll-ll2)
Another study that tried to examine these psychological forces
was done by Hertzman and Fe stinger (1940) •

They found tha. t subjects

set their IOAs slightly higher than their ability and then try to reach
it, thus using LOA as an incentive.

Using different statiHtical

techniques, Lezak and Raskin (1950) contradicted the conclusions of
Hert~

and Fe stinger.

Instead of obtaining the usual goal dis-

crepancy score by subtracting the level of performance on the immediate

10
past trial .from the stated IDA, Lezak and Raskin subtracted the mean
o.f all previous performances.

While the conventional goal discrepancy

score generally shows the subjects to have a tendency to overestimate,
this measure showed a tendency to be cautioUs and to state a IDA
slightly lower than the mean o.f past performances.

If this is indeed

a mre accurate measure of goal-setting behavior, it supports the
possibility that fear of embarrassment may be an important factor
operating in the laboratory situation.
Siegel (1957) compared goal-setting behavior to the process
of decision making.

In setting a

LOA, the subject tries to strike a

balance between the probability of success and the probability of
failure in obtaining an incentive or achieVing a given performance
level.
~~egel

Need states and personal history are other relevant factors.
stressed that the subject's evaluation of the probabilities

for success and failure are quite subjective.
Other studies have investigated the effects of external forces
on the setting of IDA.

Irwin and Mintzer (1942) told half of their

subjects that their names and performances scores were to be made
public, while the other

h~

were told that they were only practicing.

They found no significant results for these two levels of motivation
on either performance or LOA.

In the research on group LOA, Zander

and Ulberg (1971) observed that social pressures arising outside a
group influence the LOAs that members choose.

Ibwever, external

standards are less influential i f they are in conflict with the group's
prior performance or with a member's degree of desire for group success.
l)}gas (1971) found that the racial COI!I>OSi tion of an audience did not

11
have a significant effect on the aspiration levels of performers.

In

general, attempts to clarify the internal and external forces that
determine IDA have been disappointing.

Although several needs have

been shown to exist, the relative strengths and interrelations
between these factors is not at all clear.
Personality traits.

The issue of psychological needs or forces

as determinants of LOA led researchers into the field of personality
types or traits.

If goal-setting behavior is at least partially

determined by psychological needs and i f various needs could be
clearly related to different personality types or traits, then there
should also be differences in goal-setting behavior related to
personality characteristics.

Rutchik (1971) found no significant

differences between the goal-setting behaviors of depressed and nondepressed college students under either competitive or non-competitive
conditions.

Atwal (1971) hypothesized that persons high in anxiety

would be ''more susceptible to written suggestions, perform more poorly
and exhibit a greater degree of unrealistic aspiration values" (p.

5190).

The results showed that written suggestions had a significant

effect regardless of anxi~ty level.

Kay (1973) studied LOA as a

personality trait but generally failed to support the contention that
self -concept determines the IDA.

In ariother effort to study IDA as a

relatively stable personality characteristic, Gould (1938) measured
the consistency in the amount and direction of the discrepancy between
performance scores and estimates of future performance for a given
subject using unrelated tasks, but she did not obtain definitive
results.

12
Several psychologists have classified their subjects as either
realistic or unrealistic on the basis of how they set their IDAs.
Festinger (1942) conclUded that subjects with a realistic attitude
had smaller goal discrepancy scores; their IDAs were roore fiexi ble

and responsive to changes in performance.

Comparable results were

obtained by Sears (1940) and by Irwin and Mintzer (1942).

Preston,

Spiers, and Trasoff (1947) stated that realistic persons focus on the
objective demands of their situation, while unrealistic persons are
:nr:>re subjective.

In setting their IDAs, realistic persons depend

primarily on their performance or ability and not on other such
statements of expectancy; the reverse is true for unrealistic
individuals.

These authors hypothesized that increasing subject

motivation woUld intensif,r hopes and fears and lead to more unrealistic
aspirations, and that increa:sing knowledge and familiarity with the
task woUld lead to more realistic aspirations.
hypotheses were not supported.

However, these

While degrees of realism have generallY

been shown to be relatively stable personality characteristics in
goal-setting oohaviors, it is unfortunate that such characteristics
have not been clearly related to other types of behavior or other
personality characteristics.

Again, it may be that the artificiality

of the laboratory situation has clouded such relationships, in that
there is an important dli"rerence between the private goals that one
sets and goals that must be announced to an experimenter.
Using the Rotter level of aspiration board as the performance
task, Lefcourt and Steff.y (1970) related LOA to the Rotter InternalExternal Control Scale.

Persons with expectancies of internal control

13
of reinforcement tend to believe that they can control outcomes and
perform accordingly.

Persons with e:xpectanciel5 of external control

perform as i f the outcomes depended upon fate.

Since skill was a

factor in the performance task, persons expecting internal control
set roore reasonable goals.

The results showed that subjects who

behaved confidently and realistically in the performance task made
fewer shifts in a gambling task, indicating a more reasonable approach
to that game.

&'upportive results were obtained in another study

(DuCette & Wolk, 1972), with subjects expecting external control
making more atypical shifts in their :WAs.
McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, and Lowell (1953) related IDA to
the need for achievement (n Ach).

For the measure of aspiration

level students were asked to state their expected examination grades,
and n Ach was determined from TAT stories.

The correlation between

n Ach and LOA was low and insignificant for those students whose
midterm standing was commensurate with grades in other courses; this
correlation was high (.45) and significant for those students whose
midterm standing was not commensurate with grades in other courses.
The authors concluded that there is little relation between IDA and
n Ach when reality is the main determinant of lOA, but the two are
related when the facts of reality conflict.

There are many additional

studies (Ausubel & Schiff, 1955; Frank, 1937; Gardner, 1940; Gould &
Kaplan, 1940; Gruen, 1945; Hanawalt, Hamilton, & Morris, 1943;
Hausmann, 1933; Klugman, 1948) which have related personality traits
to LOA.

Others (Attkisson & Anker, 1970; Eysenck & Himmelweit, 1946;

Fineman, 1970; Himmelweit, 1947) have investigated the manner in which

Ii'I i

varioUS clinical popUlations set their IDAs.

The research on clinical

groups has shown that these individuals show greater variability in
their goal-setting behavior than do normals, tending to set their
goals unrealistically high, unrealistically low, or both.

This seems

to represent a protection against feelings of failure, in that the
individual aspires to goals that are either too hard or too easy.
The research on the relationships between personality traits
and goal-setting behavior has been both promising and frustrating.
It is true that many specific relationships have been found, but
there is also a marked lack of theory to integrate these findings and
give meaning to them.

It would seem that the lack of theoretical

frameworks is at least partly attributable to the lack of theory
regarding IDA itself.

This concept has traditionally been studied

with great quantitative emphasis, but without corresponding emphasis
on giving :rooaning to the numbers.
SUccess and failure e:xperiences.

When the concept of IDA was

first introduced, it was used to examine the manner in which persons
experience feelings of

succes~

or failure.

However, this line of

research was quickly dropped because American psychologists in the
1930's thought that it was lacking in scientific rigor.

Instead,

psychologists studied the shifts that subjects make in their LOAs
following experiences of either success or failure.

Several studies

(Ausubel & Schiff, 1955; Festinger, 1942; Frank, 1941; Jucknat, 1937;
McGehee, 1940; &~edden, 1936) investigated such shifts within a series
of trials on the same task.

In all of these studies, IDAs tended to

increase after a success and decrease after a failure.

However,
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subjects were generally more responsive to success than to

failur~

in that the decreases following failures tended to be smaller than

the increases following successes.

Also, there were IOOre upward

shifts after successes than downward shifts following failures.
steisel and Cohen (1951) pointed out the quantitative emphasis in
this line of research:

success and failure were defined according to

whether or not the performance reached the stated LOA.

Although these

operational definitions certainly are advantageous in their clarit,y,
they also have distinct disadvantages in light of the previously seen
strategies in goal-setting behavior.

These operational definitions

are pro ba.bly only valid for realistic goals.

This area of research

has suffered from a decided lack of multiple operationism (Crano

&

Brewer, 1973).
Others working in this field have examined the effects of
success or failure in one task on the IDA in another task.

Jucknat

(1937) found results comparable to those for a series of trials Using
the same task, but with the size of the transference effects depending
on the similarity between the two tasks.

Frank (1935b) found that

IDAs on a task of IOOderate difficulty tended to be higher when following
an easy task than when following a hard task.

Using sC:Ill'lple questions
I

as the first "task," Koulack (1971) cited supportive results.

'II!

I

1!1

II
Pennington (1940) asked college students to estimate grades and found
that one of the factors entering into these estimates was past perfonnance in related areas.

This study differed from those of Jucknat,

Frank, and Koulack in that the earlier success or failure experiences
did not take place in the laboratory situation.

Thus success and
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failure experiences affect goal-setting behavior both in the laboratory
and in the real world, with the size of the effect depending at least
partiallY on task similarity.
Reference groups.

Another factor which affects the marmer in

which individuals set their personal goals is the existence of
reference groups.
existence of

11

Hilgard, Sait, and l~aret (1940) described the

a frame of reference in which the individual's performance

is placed on the scale formed by the performance of his group" (p. 341).
Anderson and Brandt (1939) provided a group of subjects with the performance scores of the group and then asked for LOAs.

They found that

subjects above the group performance average tended to have negative
goal discrepancy scores, subjects close to the group average tended

to have slightly positive goal discrepancy scores, and those subjects
below the group average tended to have large and positive goal
discrepancy scores.

Thus subjects tended to align their :WAs with the

group's mean performance score.

SUch effects have also been dem:mstrated

when subjects are told the scores of other groups.

Gould and Lewis

(1940) and Hertzman and Festinger (1940) found that the effects of
reference groups depend on the characteristics of these groups relative
to the individual subjects.

Festinger (1942) found that, the higher

the status of a group, the :roore influential it is i f one is scoring
above it and the less influential it is i f one is scoring below it.
While the influence of reference groups has been clearly demonstrated,
Chapman and Volkmann (1939) found that such effects are negligible when
the subjects have had a great deal of practice and know how well they
did in this practice.
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The results of a study by Payne and Hauty (1955) suggested
that the reported scores of reference groups not only affect stated
LOAs but also performance.

Subjects were told the typical scores of

persons like thelll5elves, but actual.zy the reported scores were one
standard deviation above that which they were purported to be.

These

subjects performed significantly better than a control group who were
given the actual typical score.
This study b,y

P~e

and Hauty raises a critical issue that was

almost completely igmred in earlier studies, that is, the unclear
relationship between IDA and performance.

As Ryan (1970) explained,

most of the researchers in the field of LOA have assumed that goalsetting behavior does affect performance, but there is considerable
doubt about the exact relationship.

There are two factors which seem

to be important causes of this confusion:

(a) the lack of under-

standing as to what the stated LOA really represents, and (b) the lack
of clear differentiation between the actual LOA and its operational
definition, the stated IDA.
Goals and performance.

At about the same time that psychologists

in Germaqy and the United st~tes were stuqying LOA, Mace (1935) was
working in Great Britain on incentives and "intention."

Although this

work was not directly related to IDA, there were strong similarities.
In Mace's study, subjects were given instructions as to how they should

set their performance goals, and thus the situation was akin to
supplying subjects wi. th IDAs or at least making suggestions to them as
to how they should set their goals.

The focus in this research was

on the relationship between goals and performance.

It is unfortunate
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t,hat these early workers in experimental psychology and applied or
industrial psychology did not combine the work in the two fields.
Mace gave different instructions to each of four groups of
subjects, and these group instructions, listed in increasing order of
ultimate performance, are as follows:

(a) the first group was told

to try to surpass their previous performance, (b) the second group

was told to try for a specific and constant score on each day 1s
performance, (c) the third group was simply told to do its best to
improve, and (d) the fourth group was given a specific performance
for each day which they were supposed to surpass if possible.

The

performance task was a computational one which had a considerable
practice effect.

The fourth group showed the greatest rate of

improvement, and therefore a specific and difficult intention resulted
in the best performance.
Bayton (1943) proposed that the psychological needs which affect
a person's LOA also affect his subsequent performance, as well as the
manner in which he evaluates that performance.

Under this assumption,

i

,,I

IDA should then be positively related to performance.
each of his subjects for three LOAs:

Bayton asked

the most they hoped to do, the

least they expected to do, and what they actually expected to do.
Using two separate performance tasks, he found a positive relationship
between LOA and performance for the more ego-involving of these two
tasks, with IDA referring to the subjects 1 actual expectancies.

Thus

Bayton concluded that LOA only has incentive value for ego-involving
tasks.

In a later study, Bayton (1948) generally supported his earlier

findings.

The author stated that "establishing specific aspirations,
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whether expressed or non-expressed, creates rore rapid learning in the
earlY trials than occurs in a relatively unstructured learning
situation" (p. 294).

However, he did not obtain significant results
.
.
tor the hypotheses that performance increases with rore specific
aspirations and that the expression of aspirations

i~

associated with

increases in level of pertonnance, although the results were in the
predicted direction.

He again pointed out that ego-imrolvement is

a mediating variable.
Holt (1946) was not tully satisfied with the conclusions drawn
by Bayton; he set out

to ascertain whether IJJA was primarily an

incentive (goal, ambition, or rotivation) or an ego defense.

Holt

recognized that this was a difficult question to answer, since both

may be true for different people and different situations.

Further-

more, depending on exactly how the subjects are asked to state their
WAs, the stated answers can refer

goals,

reali~tic

to different entities:

hoped-for

expectations, estimates of minimum performance, etc.

According to the incentive hypothesis, WA should be positively
correlated with performance, while this correlation should not exist
under the ego-defense hypothesis.

Holt asked students to predict

grades on important tests and did not find a significant correlation
"between aspiration and achievement" (p. 415).

On the basis of these

results, Holt claimed to have supported the ego-defense theory.

This

conclusion is dubious, since a failure to support the alternate
hypothesis does not necessarily constitute support for the null
lzypothesis.
Citing these results and also the earlier results of Bayton
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(1943), Holt proposed three hypotheses:

(a) when there is minimal

ego-inVolvement LOAs are basically realistic estimates with little
motivational value, (b) when there is a low degree of ego-involvement,
IOAs are somewhat representative of the degree of motivation and have
little significance as an ego-defense, and (c) when ego-involvement
becomes sufficiently high, ego-defensiveness is an

~rtant

factor

and the IDA is then a complex hybrid of the two considerations.

In

effect, Holt was hypothesizing a curvilinear relationship in which

LOA would have incentive value at moderate levels of ego-involvement.
During the 1950's there were relatively few researchers who

attempted to further explore the relationship between LOA and performance.

In the mid 1960's there was renewed interest in this area,

but this more recent research followed the emphasis of Mace on applied
and industrial interests.

studies bf Locke (1966a) and

qy Locke and

Bryan (1966a) supported the previous findings of Mace that subjects
performed better when given specific, high goals to strive for.

The

subjects who were allowed to choose their own goals tended to set
moderately easy ones or vague ones, like doing their best.

The overall

performance of these subjects was lower than that of the subjects given
specific and difficult goals.

However, when a subject did set a

difficult goal without being specifically told to do so ey the
experimenter, his performance tended to be higher.

Combining these

results, the conclusion is that subjects perform better when they
adopt specific and difficult goals.
According to Ryan (1970), some have criticized these studies on
the grounds that those subjects with higher goals might be more
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motivated in other ways, and thus there is no necessary causal
relationship between goals or intentions and subsequent performance.
However, other studies contradict this contention.

On the basis of'

performance and attitude ratings on an addition task, Bryan and wcke
(1967) divided their subjects into high motivation and low motivation
groups.

The subjects in the high motivation group were then told to

simply do their best on the next task, while the subjects in the low
mtivation group were given specific goals by the experimenter.

By

the end of' the second retest on the task, the differences between the
two groups were largely erased in regard to both performance and
favorable attitudes toward the task.

The authors concluded that the

use of' specific and dif'ficul t goals can be used to increase the
performance of' those subjects who have little motivation in the task
situation.

These authors summarized their results as follows:

The assigning of' specific and reasonably hard goals to these
Ss raised performance level and favored the development of' more
positive attitudes toward the task. On the other hand, telling
the high-motivation Ss to do their best resulted in little
performance increase-and the development of increasingly less
favorable attitudes toward the task. (p. 277)
Several other studies (wcke, 1967a, 1967b; Locke & Bryan, 1966b,
1967) supported the existence of' a positive relationship between level
of' performance and the difficulty of' the goal assigned to the subject.
The contention that persons who are given JOOre difficult goals not only
perform better but also like the task better has been supported in
other studies (Locke, 1965, 1966b; Locke & Bryan, 1967).
Although these experiments left little doubt that the goals for
which a person strives are at least partial determinants of' ultimate
performance, further work by IDcke and his associates showed that this
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relationship is even stronger than was previously thought.

IDcke.

(1967a) was not fully satisfied with the previous research soowing
that knowledge of' results (KR) acts as an incentive to better
performance.

In his experimental ·design Locke separated the effects

of KR from those of' goal-setting and found that, while the subjects
given specific and hard goals again performed better, there was no
significant effect for knowledge of' results.

Locke concluded that the

"effects previously attributed to differential KR were actually due
to different levels of motivation produced by the different goals"

(p. 324).

In subsequent research, Locke, Cartledge, and Koeppel

(1968) hypothesized tha.t KR may result in better performance if' it
provides the subject with feedback on the type of' eiTors he is making,
but they disputed the zootivational or incentive value of' KR.

According

to the authors, KR appears to have m:>tivational value merely because
subjects can use this knowledge to set their goals, and thus "goal
setting mediates the effects of' KR" (p. 476).

The results supported

their hypotheses, although their conclusions were based on a failure

to reject the null hypothesis.
Relating these findings to the effects of' monetary incentives
on performance, Locke, Bryan, and Kendall (1968) hypothesized that
"monetary incentives would affect task performance only through or by
means of' their effects on the individual's goals or intentions" (p.
104).

The results showed a significant relationship between goals

and performance but an insignificant relationship between monetary
incentive and performance.

Thus there was some support for the authors'

assumption that "goals and intentions are the most i.Jnroodiate determinants
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of an individual's behavior" (p. 104).

However, the authors warned

that the use of incentives to increase level of performance can be
very effective, since they can serve to change a person 1 s intentions.
The authors attempted to show how.such incentives work--through their
effect on goals.

The authors found that all-or-none incentives, in

which a goal was automatically imposed upon the subjects, resulted in
overall better performance than a piece-rate incentive, which allowed
the subjects to set their own goals.

Subjects under the piece-rate

system tended to set lower goals than those under the all-or-none
system.

Goals and intentions do seem to be mediators of the effects

of incentive on behavior, but further research is needed (Ryan, 1970).
Locke and his associates have obviously collected an impressive
amount of experimental data to support their belief that inducing
subjects to strive for specific and reasonably difficult goals results
in a higher level of performance.

What is almost equally impressive,

however, is the fact that the relevance of this research to the field
of LOA has barely been explored.
behavior and

ult~ate

Both areas deal with goal-setting

performance--one with the goals that a person

adopts of his own volition and the other with the goals that a person
is under some type of pressure to adopt.

The only psychologist to

make a serious effort to bridge this gap is Ryan (1970).

The

explanation for this may lie in the current lack of popularity of
LOA studies.
Methodological considerations.

Another possible explanation

is the confusion related to methodological differences in LOA studies.
SUtcliffe (1952) cited methodological problems as one of the reasons
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for the folloWing inconsistencies in the research on LOA:

(a)

generalization across tasks and situations, (b) the effects of
success and failure, (c) goal-setting behavior as a personality
trait, and (d) the relationship between goals and performance.
Ricciuti (1951) stated that, "The problem of methodology thus constitutes a consideration of major importance both in the interpretation
and evaluation of previous studies, and in the planning of new
research" (p. 2).
One source of the methodological differences is the wording
of the question designed to elicit the subjects' LOAs.

While this

may seem to be a minor consideration, research has shown otherwise.
Diggory (1949) found that goal discrepancy scores were twice as great
when he asked subjects what they "hope" to do as opposed to asking
them what they "expect" to do.

Irwin and Mintzer (1942) obtained

comparable results using the words ''hope 11 and "predict," as did
Festinger (1942) using the words "think" or "expect" as opposed to
"like" or "intend."

Preston and Ba.yton (1941) asked each of their

subjects to state three I.OAs:

the best they expected to do, what

they actually expected to do, and the least they expected to do.
actual and the maximum estimates were highly correlated.

The

Since these

subjects placed their actual estimates closer to their maximum than to
their minimum estimates, the authors concluded that the subjects tended

to be somewhat optimistic in their actual estimates.

Despite these

differences in stated LOA based on the wording of the questions,
neither these authors nor Irwin and Mintzer found corresponding
differences in performance.

Another methodological problem is the performance task used.
The majority of the experiments on WA have featured tasks that can
be

indiVidually administered, that easily yield performance scores,

and that require a short period of time.

Ricciuti (1951) stated that

psychonDtor tasks have been the :roost popular.
are dart throwing (Irwin

&

Examples of such tasks

Mintzer, 1940; McGehee, 1940; Preston,

Spiers, & Trasoff, 1947; Snedden, 1936), ring toss (Fineman, 1970;
Rutchik, 1971), a target game (Mace, 1935), and printing (Frank, 1935).
others have used tasks emphasizing cognitive abilities, such as
arithmetic problems (Gould, 1939; steisel & Cohen, 1951), scrambled
words (Rutchik, 1971), logical and spatial relations (Frank, 1935),
mazes (Jucknat, 1937), coding (Snedden, 1936), synonyms (Gould, 1939;
Hertzman & Festinger, 1940), symbol-digit substitution (Gould, 1939),
and information (Hertzman & Festinger, 1940).

Athletic games (Harvey,

1971) and school grades (Holt, 1946; Pennington, 1940) have also been
employed.

Locke and his associates have used psycho:rootor, perceptual,

and computational tasks.
According to Ricciuti (1951), :roost psychologists working in
the LOA field have generally agreed that the ideal task is an interesting one with fairly high ego-involvement and a moderate level of
difficulty.

Few, if arry, of the aforementioned experimental tasks

match this ideal, particularly since marry of the experiments required
a great mmiber of repetitions of the same task.

On the contrary, it

seems that most of these tasks can best be described by the single
word, "boring."

In a person's actual life, issues of aspirations and

goal-setting behavior are primarily related to tasks that are far more
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complex and multivariate, with multiple options of both quantity and
quality.

The nature of the tasks that have been used severely limits

the generalizability of the research on LOA.
Causal Attribution
Because of these and other frustrations that have been
encountered, !JJA :oow seems to be a "dead" area of research.

But in

recent years, social psychologists have carried out research that is
relevant to LOA.

Experimental results indicate that the manner in

which a person attributes causality has a direct effect on the
aspirations or goals that he sets and on his subsequent performance.
This research is particultirly inportant in light of tiiegel's (1957)
discussion of the role of subjective probability and expectations in
setting IJJAs.
Heider (1958) described four sources that people use to explain
and to predict task performance and task outcome:

(a) ability, a

stable and internal factor, (b) effort, a variable and internal
factor, (c) task difficulty, a stable and external factor, and (d)
luck, a variable and external factor.

Thus the two dimensions of

causal attribution are stable-variable and internal-external, the
latter dimension referring to locus of control.

In evaluating past

performance or future action, a person attributes various degrees of
causality to each of these four factors.

Naturally, people must

depend on numerous sources of evidence to make their causal
attributions.

When an individual attributes ability as the cause of

his performance, he often bases this attribution on past performance
in the same or a similar task, on the pattern of his performance over
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time, and on the performance of others.

In making attributions of

causality to task difficulty, a person depends primarily on prior
success, and, in the absence of that, on the performance of others.
The pattern of performance or outeome over time is the nnst important
factor in attributions to luck.

Attributions to effort are based on

factors which are often difficult to delineate.

Relevant factors

seem to be the degree of incentive, bodily cues, pattern of performance,
and attributions to the other three sources.

Two needs which

influence these causal attributions are the needs to see oneself with
as much ability as possible and to see oneself realistically (Jones,
Rock, Shaver, Goethals, & ward, 1968) •
One of the major determinants of causal attributions is the
initial expectations that a person has in regard to outcome.

Feather

and binon (197la, 197lb) described two theoretical models that predict
how initial expectations relate to subsequent attributions of outcome.
The first model (Feather & Simon, 197la) adheres closely to Heider's
(1958) formulations:
The naive an~lysis of action predicts that when a person's
expectation of success is disconfirmed qy an outcome, then he
will tend to appeal to variable factors (luck and/or effort)
to explain the outcome, since the other possible causes of
outcomes (those involving ability and task difficulty) are
assumed to be stable. (p. 185)
According to the naive action model, a person's assumptions regarding
the causes of an outcome will be confirmed i f his original expectation
is confirmed.

One of the basic assumptions of this nndel is that a

person's expectations are based on those factors in the situation that
are stable, that is, ability and task difficulty.

When the original

expectation is confirmed, previous assumptions about cause are confirmed;

28
when expectations are not confirmed, the person then tends to attribute
the outcome to variable factors, that is, effort and luck.
Feather and Simon (197lb) explained the balance model in the
following manner:
good outcomes (success) will be attributed to self (internal
attribution) when there is positive self-evaluation with respect
to the performance task (high expectation of success) but will
be disowned (external attribution) when there is negative selfevaluation (low expectation). It also assumes that bad outcomes
(failure) will be attributed to self (internal attribution) when
there is negative self-evaluation (low expectation) but will be
disowned when there is positive self-evaluation. (pp. 537-538)

I
I
!

Both of these models were derived from Heider's formulQtions
and the two are not necessarily contradictory--they often make the
same predictions.

The naive action model is more broad because,

unlike the balance model, it takes into account stable external
factors (task difficulty) and variQble internal

f~ctors

(effort).

In

this regard the naive action model adheres more closely to Heider's
theory.

However, the balance roo del makes stronger hypotheses.

the naive action model proposes that unexpected outcomes are

\.Jhereas

~

likelz to be attributed to variable factors than are expected outcomes,
the balance model predicts that expected outcomes will be internally
attributed and unexpected ·outcomes will be externally attributed.

It

must be emphasized that, under the balance model, internal attribution
refers only to ability (and not effort) and external attribution to
luck (and not task difficulty).

Thus the balance model does not

provide for the stable-variable dimension.
Feather (1969) attempted to determine which of these two models
is toore accurate.

He asked subjects to make causal attributions of

task outcome to ability and/or luck.

Feather found that expected
i I
I
I

l'li,.l
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results were generally attributed to ability (internal) and that
unexpected results were generally attributed to luck (external).
Although this experiment gave no consideration to the stable-variable
dimension, Feather believed that the results not only supported the
weaker (naive action) hypothesis but also the stronger (balance model)
hypOthesis.
In a subsequent study, Feather and Simon (197la) asked subjects
to make attributions on a single scale with luck at one pole and

ability at the other pole.

The results showed that unexpected results

were attributed to luck more often than were expected results.

How-

ever, the authors did not find that unexpected results were generally
attributed to luck while expected results were generally attributed
to ability.

The authors concluded that the results supported the

weaker hypothesis but did not also support the stronger hypothesis.
They qualified this conclusion with the observation that subjects
tended to make intermediate ratings and avoided the internal and
external poles; they suggested that the results might therefore be
misleading.
To clear up this confusion, Feather and Simon (197lb) conducted
a similar experiment, but this time they asked each subject to make
ratings of causal attribution on four scales:
difficulty, and effort.

ability, luck, task

As in the earlier study by Feather (1969),

they found that unexpected outcomes were generally attributed to luck
(a variable and external factor) and that expected outcomes were
generally attributed to ability (a stable and internal factor).
authors interpreted the results as being supportive of both the

The
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weaker (naive ~ction) and the etronger (balance) hypotheees. · McMahan
(1973) pointed out that this interpretation is mt fully warranted.
In their research, Feather and Simon focused primarily on the relative
strength of the two hypotheees--the naive action model predicting in
terms of "more likely" and the balance model making definite predictions
of causal attribution.
balance roodel.

In this regard the results did support the

However, these authors overlooked one crucial element,

the stable-variable dimension.

The results simply showed that

1m-

expected outcomes were attributed to luck while expected results were
attributed to ability.

They interpreted luck as an external

attribution and ability as an internal attribution, and thus the
experiment was supportive of the balance model.

One could make an

alternate interpretation, citing luck as a variable factor and ability
as a stable factor.

Considering that the balance model makes m

provision for effort or task difficulty, the designation of this model
as the stronger hypothesis is certainlY debatable.

The fact that the

results of their study (Feather & Simon, 197lb) did not support the
predictions of the naive action model regarding attributions to effort
does not provide conclusive support for the contention that the
balance model is better.
Interestingly, Feather and Simon cited an experiment by Frieze
and Weiner (1971) as supporting their conclusions.

Yet the results

obtained by Frieze and weiner seem to be more in line with the naive
action model.

The authors asked each subject to imagine that he or

another person was to engage in an achievement-like activity.

Each

subject was given the following information about the task situation:
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percentage of previous successes and failures at the same and at
similar tasks, percentage of successes and failures for others,
amount of time spent on the task, task structure, whether the subject
himSelf or another person is performing the task, and task outcome.
The authors believed that this was enough information to allow each
subject to make essentially the same type of causal attributions that
they would make in everyday life.

Each subject attributed causality

to the four factors discussed by Heider (ability, luck, task difficulty,
and effort) on a rating scale from 0 (not a cause) to 3 (very much a
cause).

They found that success was nnre likely to be attributed -to

internal factors than was failure, while failure was more likely to
be attributed to external factors.

The results also showed that the

subjects tended to attribute expected outcomes to stable factors and
unexpected outcomes to variable factors.

Feather and Simon (197lb)

were correct in citing this experiment as supportive of the stronger
hypothesis, but they should also have emphasized that t."le predictions
of the naive action model relating to variable factors were also
supported.

The data obtained by Frieze and weiner actually seem to

suggest a hybrid of the two models, with the basic predictions of the
naive action model and the strength of the balance model.
Citing the Frieze and Weiner study, McMahan (1973) suggested
that an "attributional" approach using all four of Heider's factors
would be preferable to the "locus of control" approach advocated by
Feather and his associates.

The attributional approach assumes that

people try to avoid making changes in relatively fixed perceptions.
Thus there is a tendency to attribute unexpected outcomes more to

l

32
variable than to stable factors, and vice versa for expected outcomes.
Accordingly, a person who attributes an unexpected or novel outcome
to a stable factor must ordinarily make some alterations in that factor

which would affect future expectancies.

However, an individual who

attributes an outcome to a variable factor need not change his future
expectancies, since expectancies are generally based on stable rather
than variable factors.

For

ex~le,

a student who expected an A in an

examination but received an F would mt have to change his expectancies
for future examinations of a comparable nature if he were able to
attribute the unexpected outcome to bad luck or lack of effort.
however, he were to attribute his F to lack of ability or task
he would feel a need to change his future expectations.

If,
difficul~J,

Thus the

stability dimension is more salient than the locus of control dimension.
McMahan aclrnowledged that previous research (Rotter, 1966;
Rotter, Liverant, & Crowne, 1961) has shown that greater shifts in
expectancy occur when attributions are made to skill rather than
chance.

However, he took issue with the interpretations offered by

the authors of these studies, who claimed that they supported the
inportance of the locus

o~

control dimension in expectancy shifts.

The

two variables studied (skill and chance) differ along both the stablevariable and the internal-external dimensions, and thus there is m
reason that the results necessarily support the inportance of the
locus of control dimension.

McMahan criticized Feather (1969) on the

same grounds.
McMahan's theoretical position is in agreement with that of
weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, and Rosenbaum (1971), who proposed

i

I
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that

11

expectancy shifts are primarily determined by the stability,

rather than the locus of control, of the attributional element"

(p. 3).

Using anagrams as the experimental task, McMahan tested the

following hypotheses:

(a) the relationship between attributions to

stable factors and subsequent expectancy is positive following success
and negative following failure; attributions to variable factors are
generally unassociated with subsequent expectancy or may even be
negatively related following success and positively related following
failure, and (b) unexpected outcomes tend to be attributed to variable
factors (luck and effort) more than to fixed or stable (ability arid
task difficulty) factors; expected outcomes tend to be attributed to
stable factors more than to variable factors.

The results supported

all of the first hypothesis, and the second hypothesis was supported
in regard to ability, luck, and effort but not task difficulty.
Overall, this study was generally supportive of McMahan's position,
although further research is clearly needed.
Kukla (1972) has attempted to combine attributional theory and
expectancy theory, on the assumption that "the way people attribute
the causes of task

outco~s

I!'

is an important determinant of the

ji
!I

454). Kukla

characteristics of their performance on these tasks" (p.

took the basic mathematical tenets of expectancy theory regarding
subjective probability of some occurrence and its subjective value
and extended this to attribution.

Looking at intensity of effort

rather than direction of behavior, the author stated that
probability depends in part on how much effort the person
expend.

Kukla reported that Atkinson (1958) had found

subje~ct~·__.....___

~~~ JoQ W£";):>

la:f.

the
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relationship between perceived difficulty and intended effort fonned
an inverted U-cu.rve, with subjects intending to expend little effort

if the task was seen as either too hard or too easy.

The degree of

intended effort also depends on the individual's perception of his
own ability; less ability requires greater effort and nnre ability
requires less effort.

The research found that perceived difficulty

decreases with continued success experiences and increases with continued failure experiences.

Relating this to effort, a subject who

first sees a task as easy but then has successive failures should then
try harder, while a subject who first sees the task as being difficult
but has continued success experience should also then try harder.
Increased effort should result in a higher level of performance for
both types of subjects.

Kukla cited his data as being supportive,

but neither his formulation nor Atkinson's accounted for all of it.
The literature from the three general areas that have been
discussed (LOA, intentions and performance, and attribution) show
obvious interrelations.

All three are concerned with performance in

achievement-like activities as a function of the manner in which a
person evaluates the task situation.
enter into this evaluation are:

Several of the variables which

ability, task difficulty, 1 uck,

intended effort, and various types of goals and aspirations.
believed that this stuqy clarifies certain interrelations.

It is

CHAPTER III
METHOD

Subjects.

The subjects were 112 male undergraduate students

enrolled in the introductory psychology course at Loyola University
of Chicago.

Those persons who had previously played with the Magnavox

Odyssey were not allowed to participate.

Fach participant was

randomly assigned to one of the eight experimental conditions.
Design.

This study employed a 2 x 2 x 2 design:

previous

success or failure experience (win or loss), previous success or
failure experience of the subject's opponent, and putative advantage
or disadvantage due to equipment bias.
measures were obtained:

The following dependent

written IJJA following the practice game,

written LOA following the information that a "bias" exi8ted, game
performance, and ratings of causal attribution on five scales.

All

measures of IfJA and performance were obtained in terms of both
winning/losing and point differential.

Because of a statistical

dependency, only the data from one student of the competing pair was
analyzed.
Apparatus.
performance task.

A game of electronic table tennis was the
This game is one of several that can be played

using an electronic device marketed b.Y the Magnavox Corporation; this
device is known as the Magnavox Odyssey and is available to the public.
The Odyssey i8 attached to a television·and the game is played on the
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television

scr~en

Procedure.

using electronic controls.
At the start of the testing session, each student

individually practiced playing this game with the male experimenter
(the author) for approximately 3 minutes.

The experimenter then

asked the subject to play a practice game up to a score of 11.

The

experimenter had sufficient expertise to control the outcome of this
game.

Dapending on the experimental condition to which the student

had been assigned, the experimenter either won or lost this game, with
the loser always scoring from 3 to 7 points.
Upon completion of this game the subject was told that he was
to play another game, this time with another student.

The subject

was then asked to write his LOA on a sheet of paper {see Appendix A)
in response to the written question, "Ib you expect to win or to lose
the game you are about to play'?"

This sheet also asked the student

to predict the final score of the game, with the winner being the
first person to reach a score of 21.

!

Presumably, the wording of these

questions tapped the subjects' realistic aspirations.

The use of a

written LOA was designed to minimize the possible effects of a public
I

announcement of goals •

I,,
! .. !i

This entire procedure was then repeated with the student who
was scheduled to be the opponent of the first subject.

Since the first

student was idly waiting during this time, this factor was counterbalanced in all experimental conditions.

The two competing students

II
,I:

~.',1·:

!il!,

I! Iii
~' il

were then brought together for their game, but were not told how
well their opponent did in the practice game.
I

'I

At this point the experimenter stated that he was going to
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adjust the game equipment such that one of the players would be at a
disadvantage, and consequently, the other at an advantage.

The

subjects were told which of the players would have the advantage and
which the disadvantage, but were also told that the degree of the
bias would not be divulged.

The source of the putative bias was the

amount of "play," or the responsiveness, in the players 1 individual
control units.
experL~nter

In actuality, there was no physical bias.

While the

adjusted a bogus control on the back of the television

set, the students were instructed to write new LOAs, in the same
manner as before.

The justification for this was the new information

regarding equipment bias.
Upon completion of the experimental game, each subject made
causal attributions (see Appendix B) on five scales:

ability, task

difficulty (including the ability of the opponent), luck, effort,
and equipment bias.

Each of these factors was rated on a 7-point

scale, ranging from 1 (not at all a cause of the outcome of the game)
to 7 (very much a cause of the outcome of the game).

In order to

minimize any detrimental effects of deception, a summary of the
completed experiment was made available to the participants.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

For all hypotheses regarding performance and/or LOA, two dependent measures were used:

win/lose and point differential.

Accordingly,

each of the relevant hypotheses was subjected to two forms of statistical
analysis, depending on the measure under consideration.
dependent measures has a particular advantage.

Each of these

Point differential

provides a more sensitive measure qy considering not only winning/.
losing (positive/negative differential) but also the degree of the
differential.

However, in game competition the opponents probably

consider point differential to be a minor conaiaeration as compared to
The difference between victories of 2 and 4 points

winning or losing.

is not the same as the di1'1"erence between a victory by 1 point and a
loss b,y 1 point.

To the opponents, the point differential may have

little motivational value, and thus players may show a decrease in
effort when a game is "in the bag."

In general, comparisons of the

two forms of statistical analyses indicated that winning/losing is
probably the more accurate· measure of both lOA and performance.
ijypothesis 1:

The Effects of Practice Game Experience on LOA

The data were

fir~t

analyzed

b,y

means of the chi-square test to

determine whether those students who had a success experience (winning
the practice game) set higher LOAs in terms of win/lose than those
students who had a failure experience.

38

The

analysi~

of these data,
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as depicted in.Table 1, supported this hypothesis (x 2

£ < .oo5).
by

= 8.45,

df = 1,

The correlation between these two measures, as determined

the phi coefficient, is .39.

A

t test on point differentials also

indicated that students who had won the practice game set significantly
higher LOAs than those who had lost the practice game

2£

=54,£< .01).

measures was .32.

(1

= 2.50,

The point biserial correlation between these two
Thus previous success or failure and subsequent

LOA were roore strongly related when both were measured only in terms
of winning/losing.
gypothesis 2:

A

Positive Relationship Between LOA and Performance

The second hypothesis proposes a positive relationship between
LOA and performance.

This contention was tested for both the original

LOA and the second LOA (recorded after being told of the putative
bias).

Using the dependent measure of win/lose, the results, shown

in Table 2, indicate the existence of a significant and positive
relationship between the original LOA and performance (x 2 = 4.42,
df = 1, E.< .025, phi = .28).

Using point differentials, supportive

results were also obtained b,y the Pearson product-moment correlation
coefficient (£ = .31, df

~54,

z

= 2.33, £ < .01). The mean of the

original LOAs was 0.32 and the stanaard deviation was 6.11; the mean
of the performances was -o.16 and the standard deviation was 9. 74.
As

in the first hypothesis, the strength of the relationship was

greater when the dependent measure of win/lose was used.
As shown in Table 3, the relationship between the second LOA
and performance was positive but not significant when considering only
winning/losing (x 2

= 2.30,

df =

1, E.> .05, phi= .20).

However, this
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Table 1
The Effects of Practice Game Experience on Original LOA

(a)

Dependent measure:

win/lose

Experience in Practice Game
Win

Loss

Win

25

14

lose

3

14

Original IJJA

(b)

Dependent measure:

point differential

Experience in Practice Game
I.Dss

Win
M

I

Original LOA

2.29

SD

J.92

M

-1.64

SD

7.35

Table 2
Relationship Between Original LOA and Performance

Original LOA
Win

Lose

Win

25

5

!Dse

14

12

Performance
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Table 3
Relationship Between Second LOA and Performance

second LOA
Win

Lose

Win

23

7

U:>se

14

12

Performance

l

I
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relationship was found to be roth positive and significant by' the
pearson correlation on point differentials (~

£. < .05).

= .25,

df

=54,

z

= 1.87,

The mean of the second WAs was 0.46 and the standard

deviation was 6. 71; as stated before, the mean of the performances
was -0.16 and the standard deviation was 9. 74.

In this case, the

strength of the relationship was greater when point differentials were

!

I
I
I

l

used as the dependent measure.
The QY,pothesis stating that there is a significant, positive
relationship between LOA and performance was supported by three of the
four statistical tests used, and even the fourth test showed the
relationship to be positive albeit nonsignificant.

Performance was

more strongly related to the original LOA than to the second LOA.

The

second LOAs had greater variance than the original LOAs, probably
because the stUdents were given no information about the degree of
the putative bias.

All four of the computed correlations were low,

ranging from .20 to .31.

I

Thus the relationship between LOA and sub-

sequent performance was relatively weak.
Hypothesis 3:

The Effects of Putative Equipment Bias on LOA and
Performa.nc~

A chi-square test (shown in Table

4) indicated that students

with the putative advantage set significantly higher LOAs than those
students with the putative disadvantage (
phi

= .53).

x2 = 15.61,

~

= 1, E.< .ooo5,

supportive results were also obtained in an analysis of

variance on point differentials ([.(l, 52 )

= 28.09, E.

< .001).

Thus

the deception of equipment bias was effective in artifically raising
and lowering LOAs in the anticipated manner.

Furthe:rm::>re, roth a
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Table

4

The Effects of Putative Equipment Bias on IDA

(a)

Dependent measure:

win/lose

Putative Bias

II
I

Advantage
Win

26

11

Lose

2

17

Second IDA

(b)

Dependent measure:

Disadvantage

point differential

Two-Way Fixed Effects ANOVA

-ss

df

MS

F

E.

Bias

848.64

1

848.64

28.09

<.001

S/F*

52.07

1

52.07

1. 72

n.s.

Interaction

52.07

1

52.07

1.72

n.s.

Error

1571.14

52

30.21

Total

2523.93

55

Source

I

I

*success or failure in practice game
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chi-square test and an ANOVA (see Table 5) indicated that the students
with a putative disadvantage in the competitive game performed at a
significantlY lower level than the students with a putative advantage
(x 2

= 5.82,

df

= 1, p_< .01,

phi= .32; ~( 1 ,

48 )

=

5.42, E.< .025).

Thus

the results supported all of the third hypothesis.
!ID'othesis 4:

'I
I

The Effects of Winning/IDsing on Causal Attributions

Four ANOVAs were used to test the hypothesis that successful
persons attribute task outcome more to internal factors (ability and
effort) than do persons who fail, while persons who fail attribute task
outcome more to external factors (task difficulty and luck) than do
successful persons.

Since statistical analysis of this hypothesis

involved four ANOVAs, a sigirl..ficance level of .01 was chosen.

I

These

ANOVAs, as shown in Table 6, did not reveal any significant differences
in the ratings on the four sources of causal attribution.

Table 7

depicts mean ratings on the four scales.
Hypothesis

5:

The Effects of Winning/Losing and Confirmed/Dis confirmed
Expectations on Causal Attributions

Four ANOVAs were used to test for differences in ratings of
causal attribution as a function of whether personal expectations were
confirmed or disconfirmed.

As shown in Table

8, no significant

differences were found in the ratings on the four scales (for reasons
previouslY stated, an alpha level of .01 was again chosen).

:Mean

ratings are provided in Table 9.
Rypothesi::; 6:

The Effects of Winning/Losing and Putative Bias on
Ratings of

~uip!OOnt

Bias

The ANOVA depicted in Table 10 indicated that stUdents who won
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Table

5

The Effects of Putative Equipment Bias on Competitive Performance

(a)

Dependent neasure:

win/lose
Putative Bias
Advantage

Disadvantage

Win

20

10

lose

8

18

I

l

Performance

(b)

l

Dependent measure:

point differential
Three-W~

Source

Fixed Effects ANOVA

ss

df

MS

F

E..

Bias

498.02

1

498.02

5.42

<.025

s/F*

189.45

1

189.45

2.06

n.s.

4.02

1

4.02

0.04

n.s.

Bias x S/F

46.45

1

46.45

0.51

n.s.

Bias

17.16

1

17.16

0.19

n.s.

135.16

1

135.16

1.47

n.s.

,11:

7.88

1

7.88

0.09

n.s.

'I,,,,I'''

OS/OF**

X

os/OF

S/F x OS/OF
Bias x S/F x OS/OF

,11

,:
lr,

I'

liti

Error
Total

4411.43

48

5309.55

55

91.90

':,1;
1111

'I

,!i

li1
'I'

!II'

*success or failure experience in the practice game
**The opponent's success or failure experience in the practice game
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Table 6

!II'I

ANOVAs (Least Squares) on the Effects of Winning/Losing

II!
,I
'I

on Causal Attributions

(a)

Ratings on ability

ss

df

MS

F

E.

W/1*

1.01

1

1.01

.66

n.s.

AID**

0.56

1

0.56

.36

n.s.

Interaction

o.6o

1

o.6o

-39

n.s.

Error

80.33

52

1.54

Total

82.50

55

Source

'

I

*winning or losing the competitive game

I

**Advantage or disadvantage in the competitive game

(b)

I

Ratings on task difficulty

ss

df

MS

F

E.

W/L

o.85

1

0.85

.41

n.s.

A/D

o.oo

1

o.oo

.00

n.s.

Interaction

0.28

1

0.28

.14

n.s.

Error

106.99

52

2.06

Total

108.12

55

Source

48
Table 6
(contd)

(c)

Ratings on 1uck

ss

df

Ms

W/1

8.00

1

8.00

2.79

n.s.

A/D

7.02

1

7.02

2.44

n.s •

Interaction

0.74

1

0.74

•26

n.s.

Error

149.22

52

2.87

Total

164.98

55

Source

(d)

F

E.
(E. > .01)

Ratings on effort

ss

df

MS

F

E.

W/L

9.96

1

9.96

5.61

n.s.

A/D

6.26

1

6.26

:;.53

n.s •

Interaction

0.4l

1

0.41

•23

n.s.

92.~5

52

1.78

Source

Error

(E_ > .01)

I

:1'.

Total

108.98

55

;1,11

''I

ill:
' 'I;

I'.'

'I,,·~

I

I

I
I
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Table 7
Mean Ratings of Causal Attribution According to
Game Outcome and Putative Bias

Skill

Task
Difficulty Luck

Effort

N

Winners (overall)

5.17

5.00

3.17

5.03

30

with advantage

5.10

4.95

2.95

4.85

20

with disadvantage

5.30

5.10

3.60

5.40

10

5.35

5.27

2.85

4.39

26

with advantage

5.62

5.38

3.50

3.75

8

with disadvantage

5.22

5.22

2.56

4.67

18

With advantage (overall)

5.25

5.07

3.11

4.54

28

With disadvantage (overall)

5.25

5.18

2.93

4.93

28

Losers (overall)

fl
,,
:i

5o
Table 8

l

l

ANOVAs (Least &Juares) on Ratings of Causal Attribution
as a Function of Winning/Losing and
Confirmed/Dis confirmed Expectations

(a)

Ratings on ability

ss

df

MS

F

E.

C/D*

0.34

1

0.34

.22

n.s.

W/L**

0.67

1

0.67

.43

n.s.

Interaction

0.$4

1

0.54

.35

n.s.

Error

80.95 .

52

1.56

Total

82.50

55

Source

I

I

*confirmed or disconfirmed expectations about winning or losing
the game
**winning or losing the competitive game

(b)

Ratings on task difficulty

ss·

df

MS

F

E.

C/D

1.93

1

1.93

.96

n.s •

W/L

1.93

1

1.93

•96

n.s.

Interaction

0.24

1

0.24

.12

n.s.

Error

104.02

52

2.00

Total

108.12

55

Source

51
A

Table 8

I

{contd)

(c)

Ratings on luck

ss

df

MS

F

E.

C/D

6.83

1

6.83

2.30

n.s.

W/L

3.83

1

3.83

1.29

n.s •

Interaction

0.02

1

0.02

•01

n.s.

Error

154.30

52

2.97

Total

164.98

55

Source
I

I
I
I

J

)I

(d)

(E..> .01)

Ratings on effort

ss

df

Ms

F

E.

C/D

2.67

1

2.67

1.35

n.s.

W/L

3.19

1

3.19

1.61

n.s.

Interaction

0.16

1

0.16

.08

n.s.

Error

102.97

52

1.98

Total

108.98
.

55

Source

(E..> .01)

I

L

Table 9
Mean Ratings of Causal Attribution as a Function of Winning/Losing
and Confirmed/Disconfirmed Expectations

Skill

Task
Difficulty

Luck

Effort

5.29

5.23

2.8o

4.97

35

won the ga.ma

5.26

5.13

3.00

5.17

23

lost the game

5-33

5.42

2.42

4.58

12

5.19

4-95

3.38

4-33

21

won the game

4.86

4.57

3.71

4-57

7

lost the ga.ma

5.36

5.14

3.21

4.21

14

Confirmed (overall)

Disconfirmed (overall)

N

53
Table 10

I

AIDVA (least Squares) on Ratings of Equipment Bias

as a Function of Winning/Losing and Putative Bias

df

W/L*

-ss
20.33

A/D**

-

F

1

20.33

6.55

<.05

)8.47

1

)8.47

12.39

<.01

).20

1

).20

1.03

n.s.

Error

161.43

Total

223.43

,,

).10

Source

Interaction

MS

52

E.

j
*winning or losing the competitive game
**Having the putative advantage or disadvantage in the competitive game
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the competitive game gave significantly lower ratings to the importance

I

of equipment bias on game outcome than did students who lost the game

(!.(1 , 52 ) = 6.55, p_ < .05).

FUrthermore, students With the putative

disadvantage rated this factor significantly lower than students with
the putative advantage ([(1 ,5 2 )
significant interaction effect.

f

= 12.39, p_ <

.01).

There was no

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Level of Aspiration
The results were in accordance with the findings of Festinger
(1942) and many others that LOA tends to be higher following success
and lower following failure.

This tendency has been consistently

reported throughout the history of research on LOA, and thus the present
replication was hardly unexpected.

However, the present stuqy general-

ized this tendency to a situation in which success and failure were
defined not in terms of reaching a previously stated LOA, but rather in
terms of winning or losing a competitive task.

It can then be said

that subjects do at least partiallY respond to the realities of their
past experience when setting LOAs.

This also implies that at least one

factor in the setting of aspirations is realistic expectations.

But

the data also indicate that LOA is far from the realistic prediction
that a computer might make; LOA is much zoore than a prediction.

Of the

56 students whose data was analyzed, 39 aspired to win their competitive
games and only 17 expected to lose.

In part, this may be a result of

the possibility that losing to the experimenter was less of a failure
experience than defeating the experimenter was a

succes~

experience,

as the students generally suspected the experimenter of being an expert
at the game task.

Yet a sizable majority (37 of 56) aspired to win on

the second LOA, even though half (28) were told that they would have

55

56
a disadvantage in their game.

Thus it seems that, in addition to

realistic expectations, personal hopes and wishes are also significant
elements in the setting of aspiration levels and goals.
The results reveal an interesting contrast between those who
aspire to win and those who aspire to lose.

respite the fact thc.t 70%

of the students (39 of 56) aspired to win, the mean aspiration level
was a victory by a score of 21.00 to 20.68.

OVerall, students with

winning WAs expected closer games (mean point differential of +3. 92,

with a range of +1 to +9) than students with losing WAs (100an point
differential

-?.94,

with a range of

-3

to -16).

The reason for this

contrast between aspiring winners and aspiring losers is not clear.

1

It may be that aspiring losers have a greater need to psychologically
prepare themselves for the worst possible outcome or for failure of
any type.

Also, it may be psychologically hazardous to hope for a

resounding victory.

In any case, the two groups seem to employ

different strategies in the setting of LOAs.

This probably accounts

for the higher correlation between previous success/failure and LOA
Ill.

when the dependent measure was winning/losing (phi = •39, point
biserial r

=

.32).

As hypothesized, the putative bias turned out to be a real bias,
albeit a psychological rather than a physical one.

Those students with

the "advantage" performed significantly better than those students with
the "disadvantage."

This provides a possible explanation for the

following phenomena often experienced by athletes:
slumps, and "psyching out 11 the opponent.

hot

t~treaks,

It is the author's opinion

that the source of the psychological bias was a self -fulfilling

L

51
prophecy.

The mean rating of causal attribution to equipment bias was

J.22 (on a scale of 1 to 7).

1

This mean rating is relatively high

considering that absolutely no physical bias existed, and this should

I

have been readily apparent to the competitorS.

i

students simply believed themselves to be at an advantage/disadvantage

L

and performed accordingly.

It appears that the

.Although the best explanation of the

performance differences seems to be that a self-fulfilling prophecy
occurred, two alternate explanations will also be considered.
The first alternate explanation is as follows : persons who
believe themselves to be at a disadvantage tend to set lower aspiration
levels, and, as a result of the decreased LOAs, perform at a lower
level than persons believing themselves to be at an advantage.

Thus

performance differences were the result of the artificially raised or
lowered LOAs.
This explanation is plausible but not probable.

The experimental

deception of equipment bias was indeed effective in manipulating the
students to artificially raise or lower LOAs.

Yet performance was more

strongly related to the original LOAs than to the second LOAs.

If

changes in LOA were the cause of performance changes, the opposite
should have been found.

Furthermore, even the relationship between

performance and original LOAs was weak although significant and
positive, with .Jl being the largest correlation found in this study.
It is thus unlikely that changes in LOA resulted in performance changes.
Before the data were collected, the author had considered the
possibility that one way to increase the performance of certain
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individuals would be to get them to raise their aspiration levels.

But

the results of this study suggest that such an approach would have
little i f any effectiveness.

Instead, it appears that higher LOAs are

more often the result of, rather than the cause of, an individual
"psyching himself up" for a performance.

Unrealistically low LOAs

probably represent a need to prepare for the possibili41 of negative
outcomes (an ego defense).

It is possible that getting certain

individuals to raise their LOAS might result in better performance,
but this effect would be primarily due to factors other than the higher
aspiration levels chosen, such as the instillation of hope or greater
confidence.

The method used by :Wcke and his associates {giving persons

specific and reasonably difficult goals for which to strive) offers
far more promise for improving performance.

MOreover, the results of

this stuqy indicate that LOA is an ineffective operational definition
for the stuqy of realistic goals or expectations.

The setting of a

LOA is a complex behavior, and LOA offers most promise as one way to
examine personality traits.
The other alternate explanation for the observed performance
differences is that the

p~tative

bias provided the students having

the disadvantage with a social excuse for losing and thus they had
less motivation to give their full effort.

Conversely, the students

having the putative advantage might be more motivated to give full
effort, since a loss would be more bruising to the ego than i f the
game had been fair.

This is certainly the more plausible of the two

alternate explanations being offered, but this explanation is still
weaker than that of the self-fulfilling prophecy.

From the author's

•I
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observations of the participating students, there was a high degree of
interest and involvement in the electronic table tennis

g~s.

With

one exception, all the students appeared to be doing their best to win.
Furthermore, there were no significant differences in the ratings on
the amount of effort expended (the "disadvantaged" students rated this
factor only slightly higher, 4.93 to 4.54).
The question then arises

a~

to how a self-fulfilling prophecy

mi..ght have operated to alter performance, i f not through the amount of
effort expended.

Non-systematic observations by the experimenter

suggested that the self-fulfilling prophecy operated by changing the
playing strategies of the opponents, that
altered.

i~,

the "game plans" were

The students with the advantage tended to play a more confident

game, combining caution, risk, and patience.

The students with the dis-

advantage tended to be more prone to adopting one of two strategies:

a

very cautious defensive game or a somewhat reckless offensive game.
These two strategies may have resulted from the putative bias being in
the defensive controls.

For whatever reason, the game strategies used

by the "disadvantaged" students were less effective.

emphasized that these observations concerning

g~

It must be

strategies were not

aystematic and may have been affected by the experimenter's expectations.
Further research is needed to determine how such a self-fulfilling
prophecy might operate.

It may be that the explanation lies in both

altered game strategies and a social excuse for failure resulting in
decreased effort.
Causal Attribution
The ratings of causal attribution showed remarkable similarity

t

'

L

6o
among the groups studied.

There were no significant differences in the

ratings on any of the four factors discussed by Heider (1958):
task difficulty, luck, and effort.

ability,

Neither of the hypotheses suggested

b,y prior research on causal attribution (the. fourth and fifth hypotheses)

were supported.
The fourth hypothesis tested was that successful students tend

,I.;;,rl
1.11

to attribute task outcome IOOre to internal factors (ability and effort)
than do students who fail, while students who fail tend to attribute
task outcome more to external factors (task dii'ficulty and luck) than
do successful students.

This hypothesis was based on the findings of

Frieze and Weiner (1971), who asked subjects to make causal attributions
after being given imaginary situations.

The failure to replicate the

findings of Frieze and 1.J'einer can be explained in two ways.

First, the

results of either study could be statistically improbable events, that
is, chance happenings.

This is an often-overlooked possibility, but it

must be emphasized that the present findings merely represent the
failure of one attempt to support earlier findings.

An

alternate

explanation, favored by the author, is that the different findings
may be the result of differences in the experimental tasks.
of

Frie~e

and Weiner were based on causal attributions in

The results

fantasi~ed

situations, and attempts should be made to generali:iie these findings to
in vivo situations.
experimental. task:

Furthermore, the present study used a very special
competition in an athletic-like game.

Athletic

competition seems to have its own ethics of causal attribution; there
is a code of good sportsmanship that calls for
good losers.

gr~cious

winners and

In the present stuqy ability and task difficulty

lj',

,!II

II.'I

•I~
I

I

II
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(including the opponent's abilit,y) were the two factors rated highest,
with mean ratings of

5.25

and

5.12

respectively.

Effort received a

mean rating of 4. 74, while luck received a lowly 3.02.

No claims are

being made about the degree to which these findings can be generalized

to other forms of game competition, as any such conclusions are clearly
beyond the scope of this experiment.

vJhat is being suggested is that

future researchers be aware that causal attributions take place in a
social situation, and, as such, are affected qy social norms and
expectations.

Theories and findings on causal attribution may have

varying significance depending on the nature of the experimental task
and the relevant social expectations.

Social norms relating to causal

attribution may not be the same for the successful politician as they
are for the successful golfer.

The social context of causal attributions

should be given greater attention.
The results also failed to support the fifth

hypothesi~,

that

causal attributions are meaningfully related to a person's original
expectations.

The results supported neither the naive action model

nor the balance model.

The failure to support either nndel can be

explained in several ways.

AS

before, the results can be due to a

chance happening or to differences in the experimental tasks.

But it

seems more reasonable to suggest that this hypothesis was not given a
fair test.

In order to test this hypothesis, it was assumed that the

IDA represented the student's original expectations.

However, the

author has already concluded that IDA is a poor operational definition
for a person's realistic expectations.

Since a basic assumption was

probably violated, no definitive conclusions regarding the fifth
I

I
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hypothesis can be made.
The finding of significant differences in the ratings on
equipment bias must be interpreted with caution.

Losers gave signifi-

cantly higher ratings to this factOr than did winners, and students
with the putative disadvantage rated this factor significantly lower
than did stUdents with the putative advantage.

The meaning of these

findings is vague because of unanticipated sources of bias.

First,

the students with the disadvantage were in a far better position to
determine that no physical bias existed, since it was their control
unit that had alledgedly been altered.

Thus these students rated this

factor significantly lower than the students having the advantage.
Second, it makes sense that this factor would be given lower ratings
by those stUdents who won despite having a disadvantage or lost despite

having an advantage.

Yet there were no significant interaction effects

to negate the tendency of losers to rate this factor higher than
winners.

The only conclusion to be made is a cautious one:

losers

are more likely to blame failure on equipment bias than winners are to
~ive

credit for success to equipment bias.

Methodological Considerations
The present
effects.

~tuqy

is a high-risk candidate for experimenter

The experiences of the students in the practice game probably

had a sizable effect on performance in the actual competition.

The

experimenter tried to keep the practice game experience as constant as
possible, but this was a. formidable task.

Those students who were

beaten in the practice game probably received better playing experience
than those students who were allowed to win.

When the experimenter

r
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played better, the student had a better learning experience.

The

experimenter may then have l.mconsciously affected game outcome by
giving differential learning experiences.

Although every conscious

attempt was made to be fair (perhaps even going in the opposite
direction), it would have been better to use a confederate who was
unaware of the expected results.
A13 a final note, the experimenter's casual observations provided

strong indications of the social factors in stating IDAs.

With very

few exceptions, the stuaents deliberately placed their recorded LOAs
face down on their desks.

No students were observed to inquire a lout

the IDAs of their opponents.
these

shea~

In general, the

student~

acted as if

carried their private secrets, and tried to minimize

disclosure even to the experimenter.

This supported the author's

previously-stated emphasis on differentiating between LOA (goals
communicated to another in a social setting) and private goals.
observations also suggest that written goals may represent 100re
realistic expectations, and thus should be given more widespread
usage.

These

r
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I

IX> you expect to win or

to lose the game you· are about to play'/

WIN _ __

IDSE - - - -

What do you expect the final score to be?
21 to

II

IX> you expect to win or to lose the game you are about to play?

WIN _ __

IDSE - - -

What do you expect the final score to be?
21 t o - - -

r
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The results of the game you have just finished can be attributed to
several factors.

Please rate each of the factors below according to

how important they were in the outcome of your game.

Each factor is

to 'be rated on a scale from:

1 - not at all a cause of the outcome of the game to,

7-

a very important cause of the outcome of the game.

The higher the rating, the more important you consider that factor to
'be.

Please read all the factors before rating them.

To make your

rating, just circle the appropriate number.

s

6

7

6

7

6

7

3 4

s
s
s

6

7

3 4

s

6

7

1.

Your skill or a bi1i ty.

1

2

3 4

2.

The difficulty of the game, including
the skill of your opponent.

1

2

3 4

3.

Luck, whether good or bad.

1

2

3 4

4.

How hard you tried (your effort).

1

2

Having the advantage or disadvantd.ge
with the equipment.

1

2

s.

Did you win or lose this game?
By what score?

21 t o - - - -

WIN _ __

LOSE---

L
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